

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI				
6	DDA	X			
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO				
20	D/OIS/DA		X		
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

To # 6 & 20: Pls comply with Para IV  
Recommendation contained in enclosure.

3 May 85  
Date

3637 (10-81)



General Services Administration  
Information Security Oversight Office

Washington, DC 20405

Executive Registry

1795

April 29, 1985

7 MAY 1985

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Honorable William J. Casey  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) was established under Executive Order 12065 and continues to function under Executive Order 12356. Sections 5.2(b)(2) and (4) of the Order authorize the Director of ISOO to oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with the Order and its implementing directives and to conduct on-site reviews of the information security programs of executive branch agencies that generate or handle classified information. To comply with the Order's requirements, Harold Mason of ISOO's staff conducted a review of the information security programs in the Office of Research and Development, Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Intelligence Community Staff on February 26, 1985.

Mr. Mason examined several aspects of the programs at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) including, among others, classification, safeguarding, and security education. The results of the inspection are contained in the enclosed report. Mr. Mason found the offices visited in the CIA to be in compliance with the Executive Order and implementing ISOO Directive No. 1. The report includes one recommendation which ISOO understands is in the process of being implemented.

I appreciate the cooperation and support provided Mr. Mason during the course of his inspection. The personnel interviewed were cognizant of their responsibilities under the Order and appeared sincere in their desire to maintain an effective information security program. If you have any questions on the enclosed report, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

STEVEN GARFINKEL  
Director

Enclosure

cc: Anthony Frasketi

Report of Inspection by the  
Information Security Oversight Office of the  
Intelligence Community Staff and the  
Office of Research and Development, Deputy Director for  
Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency

I. General

On February 26, 1985, Harold Mason, Information Security Program Analyst, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), inspected the information security programs in the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) and the Office of Research and Development (ORD), Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DDS&T), to determine their degree of compliance with Executive Order 12356 and ISOO implementing Directive No. 1. ISOO's inspection continued to concentrate on safeguarding procedures, security education, and marking procedures. [redacted] Classification Officer, Information Management Branch, coordinated the visit with the CIA offices and accompanied Mr. Mason on the inspection.

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II. Findings

A. Classification/Marking

All documents reviewed by Mr. Mason were properly classified and portion marked. Classification actions taken in ORD are reviewed by a second party as a "check and balance" system, because it is imperative that all information be properly classified and marked. In his review of the offices, Mr. Mason did not observe an original classification decision. In ORD and ICS portion marking practices are excellent. ICS reports are generally a synthesis of information derived from meetings and source documents. Derivative classification decisions are usually based on the CIA classification guide.

Sections 2001.20 through 2001.22 of ISOO implementing Directive No. 1 outline the proper procedures for the application of derivative classification markings whenever documents are classified derivatively on the basis of source documents or classification guides. Mr. Mason noted a lack of consistency in some ICS documents. The following are examples of markings used on similar type reports:

1. "Classified by: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_  
Derivatively classified by: \_\_\_\_\_"

2. "Derivatively classified by:\_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify:\_\_\_\_\_  
Derived by:\_\_\_\_\_."

Reports or studies produced by the ICS are often widely disseminated and used as a basis of further derivative classification. It is important that the markings be consistent. The staff seemed most anxious to resolve this problem. Mr. Mason provided them with an ISOO produced "Marking" handbook, and training sessions will be scheduled utilizing an ISOO produced slide/tape presentation on marking procedures.

B. Safeguarding

The protection of national security information, sources, and methods is an ongoing program. No deficiencies were detected in any of the areas visited.

C. Security Education

The areas visited do not have individual training programs. Most of the training is provided by the Office of Training. Individuals are provided any additional training needed and attend various training courses.

III. Conclusion

The Office of Research and Development and the Intelligence Community Staff are in compliance with Executive Order 12356 and the ISOO implementing Directive. Implementation of ISOO's recommendation will further enhance the information security program of the ICS.

IV. Recommendation

Provide ICS personnel with additional training on marking procedures.